We analyze the merits of delaying pro…table investments, where such delays allow for more internal funding and keeping a higher stake in the …rm. We show a selfreinforcing mechanism where entrepreneurial …rms with better investment opportunities also invest sooner. Despite hoarding less cash, such …rms might, nevertheless, have high cash holdings when they mature. Furthermore, we show that private …rms hoard less than public …rms. We also highlight the contrasting implications of different types of …nancing frictions for hoarding. Cross-sectional predictions emerge with di¤erences in vision or incentive problems, but not, as commonly assumed, with information asymmetry or private bene…ts.
Introduction
The importance of cash hoarding as a way to reduce the exposure to potentiality prohibitively costly outside …nancing has been recognized to have …rst-order importance by both the empirical and theoretical literature (Opler et al., 1999; Bolton et al., 2011) . However, the overwhelming abundance of cash in large prominent …rms, such as Apple, sometimes tends to shift attention away from the heterogeneity of motives for cash hoarding across di¤erent types of …rms. In this paper, we analyze a slice of the cash phenomenon by addressing several open questions regarding cash hoarding in growth …rms.
One open question is whether growth …rms should delay investment in order to hoard cash and reduce dependence on outside funding. And if they do so, is it true that …rms with better investment opportunities should hoard more so that their owners keep a higher stake in the …rm or should they rather avoid delay and …nance growth externally. As a consequence, should we expect …rms with better prospects to actually grow more slowly or should we, instead, observe a self-reinforcing e¤ect where, by hoarding less and delaying less, they quickly outgrow their lesser-potential peers. Another question is how the decision to be public or private interacts with hoarding incentives and whether this could explain why private …rms hoard less cash than comparable public …rms (Gao et al., 2013 ). At a more basic level, we have only a limited understanding of how the nature of di¤erent frictions between outside …nanciers and insiders a¤ect cash hoarding, and to what extent such frictions in growth …rms can be brought into connection with the increase in cash holdings over the last decade (Bates et al., 2009 ).
We address these questions in a simple dynamic model of cash hoarding in which a …rm wants to make something "big and bold." In our baseline setting, entrepreneurs and …nanciers may have a di¤erent vision about the future. Such di¤erences may lead to disagreement about the optimal course of action and make external …nancing costly. Note that with di¤erences in vision we do not refer to asymmetric information but to a di¤erent way of looking at the world. Hence, vision is not something that can be proved right or wrong, and …nanciers may not be willing to …nance entrepreneurial visions with which they disagree. Hoarding cash seems, thus, a natural alternative for visionary-entrepreneurialbusinesses to gain some leeway or elbow room. After deriving our main results, we compare our insights to those emerging from other …nancing frictions.
An important cost of cash hoarding is that it may lead to delays in investment. We show, …rst, that in an environment with potentially greater gains to entrepreneurshipi.e., with more pro…table investment opportunities on average-shorter delays are optimal. Intuitively, …rms with better opportunities are willing to depend more on external funding, because the cost of delay is increasing in the attractiveness of the opportunities. Thus, …rms with a higher growth potential also choose to expand more quickly. Furthermore, being more successful, these …rms might end up being cash-rich as they mature despite pursuing a low-cash strategy in their growth phase.
Stark implications come up when relating cash hoarding to a …rm's choice between public and private ownership. Private ownership may allow for a greater alignment in vision with …nanciers. However, it is not without costs as the liquidity bene…ts of public ownership might be substantial. Trading o¤ these e¤ects, the paper shows that when the choice between public and private ownership is endogenous, private …rms hoard less cash than public …rms. The reason is that …rms choose private ownership when alignment is of paramount importance for obtaining cheaper …nancing. That is, …rms that choose to be private are those that bene…t most from alignment, because they prefer raising more external …nancing and hoarding less cash. Our analysis implies that this is more likely to be the case for visionary …rms with better investment opportunities.
The second contribution of the paper is to contrast how the nature of di¤erent frictions a¤ects cash hoarding. On the one hand, our intuition and results are robust: We can derive the same qualitative results in a setting in which …nancing is costly due to incentive problems stemming from a lower stake in the …rm ala Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) . On the other hand, other typical frictions, such as information asymmetry and private bene…ts, are surprisingly powerless in yielding cross-sectional predictions. The reason in the case of private bene…ts is simple: Delaying investment is just costly and does not resolve the problem that the private bene…ts accrue only to the manager. Thus, a manager that values an investment opportunity higher because of private bene…ts would not delay investment to hoard cash.
Similarly, in a setting with asymmetric information, …rms would hoard the same amount of cash regardless of the pro…tability of their investment opportunities. Separation with di¤erences in hoarding across types is not possible, and the only pooling equilibrium that survives re…ning out-of-equilibrium beliefs with D1 is with zero cash hoarding. The reason is that …rms with better projects are most hurt by delays caused by hoarding. Thus, they seek to minimize hoarding, but this strategy can be easily mimicked by …rms with less lucrative investment opportunities. This causes a rat race to zero hoarding by all.
In light of this striking di¤erence between information asymmetry and di¤erences in vision, it is reassuring that our disagreement results are robust when di¤erences in vision and information asymmetry are jointly present. Then, the positive hoarding levels induced by disagreement e¤ectively give some slack to inducing separation of types. Firms with good investment opportunities can now separate from lower quality types by choosing to hoard less cash than such types. We extend our model along several dimensions. We allow …rms to hoard cash before the investment opportunity arrives. Now all …rms hoard cash before arrival, but considering both the pre-and post-arrival hoarding, the key insight that …rms with better opportunities hoard less cash continues to hold. Similarly, considering the asymmetric information setting, we continue to …nd that …rms cannot separate: …rms choose to hoard cash until arrival of the investment opportunity, and then immediately invest upon arrival. In a separate extension, we show that our insights are robust also when di¤erences in vision and the pro…tability of the investment opportunity vary over time.
Furthermore, we analyze how the type of …nancing and payouts interact with cash hoarding. We obtain that …rms hoard less cash to co-…nance new investments when they have access to debt …nancing than when they issue more-information-sensitive securities, such as equity. Intuitively, the cost of …nancing caused by disagreement (and, thus, the necessity to hoard cash) matters less when …nancing is in a less "disagreement-sensitive" security. Furthermore, we show that dividend policy and share repurchases play no role when fresh capital is needed for new investments. Paying out cash only increases the dependence on external …nancing, and is, thus, counterproductive.
Our results give rise to a rich set of empirical implications. We predict that from the subset of …rms with (pro…table) investment opportunities, …rms with lower cash-toassets ratios will be more pro…table. Furthermore, the long-term performance of growth …rms that make new investments with a higher proportion of outside …nancing should be better. In terms of dynamics, we expect that …rms participating, for example, in merger waves in the beginning of the cycle should on average perform better than …rms that join later with a higher proportion of internal funds. 1 More broadly, an important insight of our analysis is that there is a self-reinforcing mechanism, in which …rms with better opportunities also invest more quickly, hoarding in the process less cash. Then, as these …rms mature, they will have a stronger cash ‡ow stream, making it likely that they end up with large cash holdings despite their original low-cash strategy. Interestingly, our, at …rst sight, counter-intuitive insight that private …rms hoard less cash than public …rms (entrepreneurial …rms with better opportunities remain private and hoard less cash) is supported by recent empirical evidence (Gao et al., 2013; Farre-Mensa, 2014) . When relating cash hoarding to pro…tability, we emphasize how important it is to control for measures of disagreement. We predict that …rms that invest in unfamiliar busi-nesses with a higher dispersion of analyst forecasts should hoard more cash. This may also shed some light on how growth …rms contribute to the steady increase in corporate cash holdings in recent years (Bates et al., 2009 ). In particular, the changing nature of growth …rms towards becoming more disagreement-prone (by being more R&D intensive and having more intangible assets, which are di¢ cult to value) may have led to more cash hoarding (Falato et al., 2013) . 2 Notably, when we contrast this with the more standard setting in which the only friction is information asymmetry, these results cannot be obtained; cash hoarding is not e¤ective in overcoming information asymmetry. Dividend policy and share repurchases are even less e¤ective when the …rm has a net funding need. Thus, growth …rms should not return cash to shareholders if it is needed for new investments. Finally, we also predict that …rms with higher debt capacity hoard less cash. Our paper mainly relates to the fast growing literature on cash. Firms hoard cash because they may be unable to frictionlessly raise …nancing for new investments. Agency con ‡icts are one important such friction. According to the free cash ‡ow hypothesis of Jensen (1986) , entrenched managers hoard cash and then invest it rather than paying it out to shareholders even when there are poor investment opportunities. More recently, DeMarzo et al. (2012) take a di¤erent perspective and show that accumulating cash reserves can be part of the optimal contract in a dynamic agency framework. Intuitively, hoarding cash as a way of deferring compensation can provide incentives to exert e¤ort (see also Biais et al., 2007) . The evidence for hoarding cash for agency reasons is rather mixed, however. 3 Firms may also hoard cash as a precautionary measure. Bolton et al. (2011) show that …rms will keep a positive balance even if this necessitates costly external …nancing, since the marginal bene…t of avoiding to seize operations is very high. In such cases, …rms with stronger cash ‡ow streams need to hoard less cash . Related, Almeida et al. (2004) show that …nancially constrained …rms save more cash out of cash ‡ows. 4 2 Falato et al. (2013) argue that the inability to o¤er intangible assets as collateral has reduced the access to debt …nancing. We argue that the changing nature of …rms may have made …rms more disagreementprone, which has made …rms less willing to depend on outside …nancing in general. This helps explain why …rms have shifted towards hoarding more cash rather than towards issuing more equity. 3 Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Pinkowitz et al. (2006) show that cash is worth less when agency problems between inside and outside shareholders are greater, and Nikolov and Whited (2013) identify low managerial ownership as a key factor. In contrast, Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009) …nd no evidence relating agency problems to cash holdings. 4 In Hugonnier et al. (2012), a …rm would hoard cash, because it may not be able to …nd a …nancier. Furthermore, in the recent literature on risk management, show that …rms with high aggregate risk exposure prefer cash to credit lines, and Rampini and Viswanathan (2010) argue that the opportunity cost of risk management is higher for constrained …rms. In contrast to this literature, in which cash and credit lines help to avoid liquidity problems, our paper asks whether growth …rms would actually delay a big investment to hoard cash and reduce their dependence on external …nancing (i.e., also
The existing evidence seems to strongly support the precautionary motive for hoarding cash (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009 ). We also substantiate this motive when we allow for hoarding prior to the arrival of the investment opportunity.
An important insight from our model is that disagreement and the lumpy nature of investment opportunities may render investment impossible without cash participation by the owner-manager, leading to delays in investment. This approach closely relates our paper to Boyle and Guthrie (2003) and Bolton et al. (2013) who analyze how optimal investment timing changes with …rms'cash holdings when external …nancing is costly. An important di¤erence to these papers is that we endogenize and contrast the di¤erent types of frictions that make external …nancing costly, which helps us derive a number of novel predictions, including implications for cash hoarding in public versus private …rms.
In terms of methodology, our paper builds on the standard real options framework of McDonald and Siegel (1986). 5 By allowing discretion in the timing of the investment, we are the …rst ones to combine the real option framework with the literature on disagreement and to discuss the resulting implications for cash hoarding. Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 contains the main analysis relating disagreement to cash hoarding, and endogenizing the choice between private ownership and going public. Section 4 contains the comparison between the disagreement/visionary model and a model based on asymmetric information. In section 5, we analyze the various extensions. Section 6 discusses the empirical implications, and Section 7 concludes.
Model
Our baseline model considers a …rm run by an owner-manager (henceforth, manager) that has an existing asset in place producing stochastic cash ‡ows. If these cash ‡ows are not invested, they accumulate in the form of cash reserves according to
As is standard in such models, and > 0 are constant and (Z t ) t 0 is a standard Brownian motion (e.g., Morellec and Schürho¤, 2011) . Our key assumption is that < r, where r is the constant discount rate used by all. This assumption, which is shared with most of on credit lines, which are anyway not common for growth …rms-Su…, 2009). 5 Related to our …nance application are Grenadier and Malenko (2011) who analyze real options signaling games. Morellec and Schürho¤ (2011) discuss …nancial contracting, and Bouvard (2012) discusses real options …nancing under asymmetric information. the literature, implies that hoarding cash within the …rm is costly to insiders. We assume that all parties are risk neutral and protected by limited liability.
The manager has a pro…table investment opportunity, requiring a cash outlay of K, which she initially does not have at hand. However, the manager has discretion over the timing of this investment. Our model is, thus, an adaptation of the standard real options framework (e.g., McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) , but di¤ers from this framework in one important aspect: the …rm is cash-constrained and may not be able to invest in a positive NPV project even if the manager can raise capital from a …nancier in a competitive capital market. We make this more precise in what follows.
Vision and Disagreement At t = 0, the manager and the …nancier publicly observe a signal about the pro…tability of the project. If the signal is good and the …rm invests, its discounted expected cash ‡ows become X G . If the signal is bad and the …rm invests, its expected discounted cash ‡ows become X B . The common parameter can be seen as a publicly observable indicator of the attractiveness of the …rm's (or industry's) growth prospects. 6 We assume that K > X B for all , so that a bad signal translates into a negative NPV project. Furthermore, X G > K at least for some , so that investing after a good signal in such cases increases value. Note that the …rm produces cash ‡ows at an expected rate < r before the investment. Thus, the opportunity cost associated with hoarding cash is paying out w t together with e¤ectively closing operations. 7 This would be a realistic assumption for many entrepreneurial …rms for which the investment opportunities are the main component of valuation. All features of our model are common knowledge, and the cash ‡ows and the level of cash are costlessly veri…able. The main feature of our vision-(or disagreement-) based model is that although both parties observe the same signal, they may interpret it di¤erently. More speci…cally, whatever inference is made by the manager, the …nancier believes that the inference is correct only with probability 2 (0; 1). The agreement parameter is common knowledge and might depend on the nature of the investment opportunity and/or the nature of the business. 8 In our baseline model, is constant over time, but we relax this assumption in 6 In Section 4 where we compare the vision setup to the information asymmetry speci…cation, we let be private information. For now, it is observable and known to all. In Section 5.6, we show how our results could also emerge from an alternative setting in which …nancing is costly due to incentive problems ala Holstrom and Tirole (1997). 7 Note that paying out all cash w t deprives the …rm from the ability to produce cash ‡ows (cf. (1)). 8 Disagreement in a corporate …nance context is usually motivated with heterogenous priors in the sense of Kurz (1994a,b )-e.g., Boot et al., (2008) . However, it can also arise due to overcon…dence on the part of either management or …nanciers (Bernardo and Welch, 2001; Daniel et al., 1998) and excessive pessimism (Coval and Thakor, 1998) or optimism (Manove and Padilla, 1999 In what follows, we only need to consider the case in which the manager observes a good signal (i.e. infers that the project is good). This is because if the manager observes a bad signal and the …nancier (fully) agrees that the project is bad, it is never undertaken and the cash at hand is paid out. If the …nancier (fully) disagrees and believes that the project is good, it may be pro…table for the manager to undertake the investment opportunity because she would be able to …nance it at very favorable terms. In that case, the manager will not use her available cash, but pay it out, and fully …nance the project with external …nancing. 9 Hence, when the manager receives a bad signal, there will not be any hoarding, and the cash at hand is paid out regardless of whether the …nancier agrees or disagrees.
The objective of our model is to analyze the …rm's cash hoarding and investment decisions when there are di¤erences in vision. We also analyze how these decisions interact with the …rm's endogenous choice between public and private ownership. In addition, we contrast the resulting insights with those from a model based on asymmetric information. To streamline the exposition, we will add more structure to the baseline model where needed.
Outside Financing At the time at which the manager raises capital to make the investment, she is facing a competitive capital market. We model this by allowing the manager to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. Since the o¤er is open to all …nanciers, they compete away all rents and only require breaking even. The manager sells equity to raise K w from the investment outlay K. 10 The …nancier's equity stake must satisfy
W F stands for the …nancier's assessment of the …rm's value, capturing that the …nancier shares the manager's assessment with probability , and disagrees with probability (1 ). From (2), the equity share that needs to be promised to the …nancier is
9 The manager's expected pro…t from fully externally …nancing the investment with equity would then be 1 10 We discuss optimal …nancial contracting in Section 5.3.
De…ne W
M := X G as the manager's assessment of the …rm's value. The manager's net expected payo¤ at the point in time in which she raises K w t and co-invests w t is:
Inspecting V (w t ; ), we obtain:
The manager's expected payo¤ V (w t ; ) from raising K w t and investing K is increasing in her co-investment w t , in the agreement parameter , and in the pro…tability parameter .
3 Di¤erences in Vision
Cash Hoarding and Investment
We will now derive how the lack of alignment between management and …nanciers-inducing potential disagreement-a¤ects investment decisions, and in turn impacts the amount of cash the …rm hoards prior to undertaking the investment. We solve for the value of the real option to invest using standard dynamic programming methods (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994 ). The problem is that of …nding the optimal stopping rule w (i.e., the level of cash holdings at which the investment is made) that maximizes the value of the option to invest U , while trading-o¤ the bene…t of reducing the funding cost against the time value of money lost from investing later, where
Applying Ito's lemma, we obtain
This equation is solved subject to the following boundary conditions. First, the manager's expected payo¤ at the time of investment should be equal to her payo¤ from investment: U (w t ; w ; ) j wt=w = V (w t ; ) j wt=w . Second, the manager chooses the investment trigger so as to maximize her value at the endogenous investment threshold:
@ @w U (w t ; w ; ) j wt=w = 0. Finally, the option to hoard cash becomes worthless as the value of cash tends to zero: lim wt!0 U (w t ; w ; ) = max 0; 1
the existing business falters (w t ! 0), then it almost surely does not recover (cf. (1)), and the manager can invest only if she raises all …nancing externally. Suppose, …rst, that disagreement is su¢ ciently strong such that K > W F . Then, solving this optimization problem yields the following expression for the manager's expected payo¤
where is the positive root of 1 2 2 y (y 1) + y r = 0, and < r implies that > 1.
Intuitively, the …rst term in (6) is the manager's expected payo¤ from investing at w , while the second term could be interpreted as the probability of reaching the cash level w and investing. Trading o¤ the marginal cost (due to < r) and bene…t of delay, the value maximizing investment threshold w V M is given by
If, instead, both parties believe that also in the presence of disagreement the investment opportunity is NPV positive (K < W F ), they both believe that there is additional surplus to be obtained from avoiding costly delay and …nancing the project immediately. Hence, there would be no cash hoarding.
Proposition 1
If disagreement is su¢ ciently strong (K > W F ), it is optimal for the manager to hoard cash prior to making the investment. The optimal cash level is given by (7) . This threshold is decreasing in and -i.e., there is less cash hoarding when the investment opportunity is better and when there is more agreement.
What this proposition points at is that the costs of delaying via hoarding are higher when the opportunities are better, implying that the manager hoards less cash. Furthermore, the cost of delay weighs more when there is less disagreement. Thus, the manager will hoard less cash when there is less misalignment in vision with the …nancier.
The simplicity of this result should not conceal the importance its implications. One such implication is that …rms with better investment opportunities also choose to expand more quickly. This leads to a self-reinforcing mechanism leading to an accelerated divergence over time between …rms with good and bad investment opportunities. Another implication is that mature …rms with strong cash holdings due to their success actually pursue low-cash strategies in their earlier growth phase (see for details Section 6).
Cash Hoarding in Public vs. Private Firms
We now add some structure to analyze the di¤erences in cash hoarding between public and private …rms. For this purpose, we explore the following trade-o¤ between public and private ownership. Financiers in private …rms hold illiquid claims; this illiquidity makes …nancing more expensive for these …rms. However, a private …rm might more easily avoid disagreement. For example, private …nanciers are often closely involved with …rms in which they invest. They also have access to sensitive information needed to better understand the business and align vision-information that the manager might be unwilling to disclose to the market and, thus, to its competitors (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Maksimovic and Pichler, 2001) . A related bene…t is that the …nanciers in private …rms are typically not dispersed, which helps to alleviate free riding and makes coordination between di¤erent classes of …nanciers easier (Brunner and Krahnen, 2008) .
More formally, we assume that a private …rm faces a lower degree of disagreement than a public …rm:
priv > pub . The downside, however, is that private ownership imposes a cost L on the …nancier, which can re ‡ect, for example, that the …nancier's investment is less liquid or the …xed costs of being more involved in the …rm. The …nancier's participation constraint when the manager raises K w as a private …rm is
where W F ( ) makes explicit the dependence of W F on the agreement parameter . Hence
and following the same steps as in (7), we obtain that the optimal levels of cash hoarding in a private and a public …rm are
Just comparing w priv and w pub does not give a clear idea if a private …rm hoards more or less than a public …rm because the decision to go public is endogenous and depends on . Thus, we need to compare the manager's expected payo¤ in both cases given her optimal cash hoarding policies. Doing so, we obtain:
Proposition 2 (i) Firms that choose to remain private hoard less cash than they would hoard if they had chosen public ownership.
(ii) Firms with better opportunities (high ) choose to stay private for higher levels of illiquidity costs L.
For understanding part (i) of the proposition, observe that the time-value-cost of delay is the same regardless of the …rm's public or private status. Hence, the endogenous choice of this status is driven by the di¤erential e¤ects of cash hoarding on the costs of outside …nancing. In a private …rm, the bene…t of less disagreement ( priv > pub ) is higher when the need for external …nancing is higher. The liquidity cost L, on the other hand, is constant. Hence, it is …rms with higher external …nancing needs (and less hoarding) that go private.
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Another implication of Proposition 2 is that entrepreneurial …rms with better investment opportunities are more likely to remain private. Since these …rms are prepared to raise more external …nancing to avoid delay (Proposition 1), these …rms bene…t most from the higher agreement and alignment of vision with …nanciers under private ownership.
Comparing Di¤erences in Vision to Asymmetric Information
What we have shown so far is that in an entrepreneurial/visionary set-up the potential disagreement between the manager and …nanciers has implications for cash hoarding and the choice of public versus private ownership. In this section, we establish how these implications compare to the role that cash hoarding plays in the more standard asymmetric information setting where …rms have private information about their investment opportunities. 12 A key insight that we develop is that in contrast to the visionary formulation, cash hoarding by delaying investment is not an equilibrium strategy in a model of asymmetric information. Hoarding cannot be part of a separating equilibrium, and the only pooling equilibrium that survives D1 is with no hoarding. This clearly distinguishes the private 11 We can also assume that the illiquidity cost has a variable component l, which is proportional to the …nancier's stake in the …rm. Then, to break even, the …nancier requires that =
. Observe, however, that l has the same e¤ect on the cost of …nancing as that of a lower level of agreement, which is also proportional to the amount raised from external …nanciers. Thus, increasing either of these costs shifts the indi¤erence threshold between public and private ownership in the same fashion, making public ownership preferable for higher . Also note that in the extreme case, in which there are only proportional illiquidity costs (i.e., l > 0, but L = 0), the choice between public and private ownership becomes trivial. It is then the same for all , and would boil down to comparing W F priv (1 l) and W F pub . 12 A comparison to a setting with private bene…ts is relegated to Section 5.5. information setting from the visionary model where hoarding/delaying was an integral part of the equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that while the asymmetric information formulation could have implications for the choice between public and private ownership, also in that context it does not lead to implications for cash hoarding.
Investment without Cash Hoarding
In the asymmetric information setting, we interpret as the privately known type of the …rm (unknown to …nanciers). It is common knowledge that is drawn from a CDF F on [ ; ]. Let b be the …nancier's belief about the now unobservable type . In (3) we now have = K w b W F and (4)- (6) need to take into account b -i.e., we write V w t ; b ; and U w t ; w ; b ; . Our assumption that the manager has access to a competitive market for capital and can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the …nancier gives rise to a game of signaling, as the manager is privately informed about the …rm's type.
A candidate for an equilibrium of the signaling game in which each type plays a pure strategy is a triple of functions (w ; ; ), where w is the cash level, which manager of type chooses to hoard and co-invests in the investment opportunity;
is the …nancier's posterior belief, which maps w into the set of probability distributions over the type set 2 ; ; and represents the …nancier's decision to …nance the project, where
: w ! [0; 1] ; with = 1 corresponding to accepting and = 0 corresponding to rejecting the o¤er. Our equilibrium concept is that of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Summarizing, the manager maximizes (5) subject to the condition that the proposed contract is individually rational for a …nancier who makes zero pro…t (i.e., analogously to (3), = K w b W F ) and who uses Bayes rule to form his posterior beliefs to draw an inference b about the …rm's type. Note that since the expected cash ‡ow of the investment is linear in , we can use b = R d ( ) to summarize the …nancier's beliefs about . The focus of the following discussion is on establishing why a separating equilibrium with cash hoarding does not exist when the only …nancing friction is information asymmetry (in Section 5.1, we follow the steps outlined here to analyze the existence of a separating equilibrium when information asymmetry and disagreement are present jointly). Note that such an equilibrium requires that the proposed contract be incentive compatible. More formally, suppose that there is a monotonic di¤erentiable function w ( ) such that outside …nanciers believe that the …rm of type exercises (invests) at w ( ). Then, if the manager decides to exercise at b w 2 w ; , outside …nanciers infer that the type is w 1 ( b w) and the manager's expected payo¤ is
which generalizes (6) . Since the exercise decision must be on the optimal path, w solves:
where, assuming that a separating equilibrium exists, we evaluate the respective FOC at
Before analyzing whether a solution to this problem exists, we start by showing a useful result.
Lemma 2 Single crossing holds because
where b is the …nancier's inference about the …rm's type .
The intuition for (12) is that, while hoarding helps to reduce the dependence on external …nancing, it is costly (as r < ) and …rms with better investment opportunities face higher costs of delay than …rms with worse investment opportunities. So at any level of hoarding and for any beliefs b , the better …rms would gain more (or lose less) from reducing the hoarding. Hence, delaying is most costly for good types. 13 Consider now a candidate for a separating equilibrium in which a high type tries to distinguish herself from low types by hoarding cash. When information asymmetry is the only …nancing friction, we have that W F = W M . In this case, a high type cannot distinguish herself from a lower type by not hoarding cash. Such a signal is not costly. Hence, a signal would be costly and, thus, potentially credible only if high types choose a higher cash level than low types. However, such a delay is costlier for a high type than for lower types and would be mimicked. Thus, it cannot lead to separation.
14 Proposition 3 There is no separating equilibrium in which a manager hoards cash. In the unique pooling equilibrium of the …nancing game satisfying D1, the manager co-…nances the investment only with her available cash at hand and does not hoard additional cash.
For arbitrary out-of-equilibrium beliefs, there is a continuum of pooling equilibria in which the manager hoards cash. Not all equilibria are intuitive in the sense of D1, however. D1 requires that upon observing a deviation, the …nancier restricts his out-of-equilibrium beliefs only to the set of types who are most likely to have deviated. Since the highest type is always the one most likely to deviate from a pooling equilibrium with positive cash hoarding, the only equilibrium that survives D1 is that all types pool at w = w 0 provided this leads to a positive payo¤ and = K w 0 b W 1 (otherwise no …nancing and investment takes place). 15 
Cash Hoarding in Public vs. Private Firms with Asymmetric Information
We discuss now the choice between public and private ownership with asymmetric information and compare it to the analysis in the visionary model in Section 3.2. To make a balanced comparison to that setting, we assume that there is less information asymmetry between the investor and the manager in a private …rm than in a public …rm. Thereby, recall that our perspective is that, due to his closer involvement with the …rm, a (sophisticated) private investor would be better able to understand the …rm. Also the manager of a growth (innovative) …rm might agree to disclose sensitive information in more detail to a private sophisticated or specialist investor than to the public market and, thus, its competitors. 16 This mimics the assumption of more agreement (higher ) in a private …rm. As before, a private …rm incurs illiquidity costs L. The outcome from solving such a setting is reminiscent of the visionary model in that …rms with higher quality projects choose private ownership. However, also now, the asymmetric information setting does not lead to any predictions about the …rm's cash hoarding policy. With asymmetric information, the issue is the possibility of self-selection. Firms with better investment opportunities have most to gain from avoiding underpricing. Given the larger information asymmetry they face when going public, they are more willing to be 15 There can be no other pooling equilibrium with w > w 0 because the highest type would then successfully deviate by undertaking the investment at a lower cash level e w < w . Analogously to the intuition behind the single crossing result (Lemma 2), the highest type is prepared to give up a larger equity share (while being better o¤ than on the equilibrium path) than lower types. Hence, for any w > w 0 , we can construct a deviation to a lower cash level, for which the highest type bene…ts and for which she is the type who is most likely to have deviated. By D1, the investor should limit his out-ofequilibrium beliefs to this type. For such beliefs, he pro…ts from accepting, making such deviation indeed successful. 16 Note that our argument is about specialist investors. Naturally, we are not arguing that general and unsophisticated investors have more information about private than about public …rms (see Ferreira et al., 2014) . private and bear the cost of illiquidity. We, thus, have an equilibrium (when L is not too large) in which …rms with better investment opportunities go private, and lower quality …rms go public. Clearly, if L becomes prohibitively large, all …rms would go public.
Proposition 4 With asymmetric information, neither public nor private …rms hoard cash, but there is a threshold 0 , such that all types above 0 operate as private, while all types below 0 operate as public …rms.
The crucial di¤erence to our visionary-framework is that there is no equilibrium in which the manager hoards cash neither as a public nor as a private …rm. This insight follows the same arguments as in Proposition 3. Thus, a framework introducing di¤erences in vision (and disagreement) delivers new insights also when comparing cash hoarding in public versus private …rms.
Extensions and Robustness
In this section we discuss several extensions. First, we analyze what happens to our visionbased model if we allow not only disagreement, but also information asymmetry (Section 5.1). Subsequently, we consider the possibility of cash hoarding prior to the arrival of the investment opportunity (Section 5.2). Section 5.3 discusses how cash hoarding and investment decisions are a¤ected when the manager uses debt instead of equity …nancing. Section 5.4 analyzes dividends and share repurchases, Section 5.5 considers private bene…ts, and Section 5.6 extends our results to a setting in which the …nancing friction is an incentive problem ala Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) . Finally, Section 5.7 discusses time-varying disagreement and expected pro…tability of the new project.
Hoarding and Investment with Di¤erences in Vision and Private Information
In light of the di¤erences in results depending on whether …nancing frictions stem from information asymmetry or di¤erences in vision (disagreement), it is reassuring that our disagreement results are robust when we allow for di¤erences in vision and asymmetric information to be present simultaneously. Speci…cally, to solve for the resulting signaling game, we make use again of the equilibrium notion and notation used in Section 4.1. The key results are that cash hoarding plays a role like in the setting with di¤erences in vision only, and that resolving the information asymmetry might now be possible.
Proposition 5
In a setting combining di¤erences in vision and asymmetric information, there is a unique separating equilibrium in which the manager separates with the amount of cash she uses to co-…nance her investment. In this equilibrium, higher types hoard less cash. There is no pooling equilibrium that survives D1.
We saw earlier that, when there is disagreement only, …rms with better opportunities hoard less cash (Proposition 1). This di¤erence in hoarding gives some slack for resolving asymmetric information when it is jointly present with disagreement. It allows …rms with better opportunities to signal their types by hoarding less cash than …rms with worse investment opportunities. This is credible since mimicking by speeding up investment and hoarding less is relatively more costly for lower types (Lemma 2).
Another di¤erence to Proposition 3 is that all types will now hoard at least some cash before becoming indi¤erent between investing and waiting to invest. Since this threshold is lower for the better type, that type can always successfully deviate from a pooling equilibrium with positive cash hoarding. Hence, there is no pooling equilibrium that survives D1.
Cash Hoarding before Arrival of Investment Opportunity
Returning to our baseline vision-speci…cation, we now extend our results to a setting in which at t = 0 the manager does not have an investment opportunity yet, but expects that such an opportunity may present itself at some future point in time. We assume that the time until this event follows an exponential distribution with parameter . The key insight from what follows is that our cross-sectional predictions from Sections 3 and 4 remain valid.
As we have shown, when there are di¤erences in vision between the manager and the …nancier, a manager who is already presented with an investment opportunity hoards w before investing (Proposition 1). The manager, therefore, delays a pro…table investment if her available cash at hand is below w . To avoid such costly delay, she could start hoarding cash prior to the arrival of the investment opportunity. Thus, her decision problem before arrival is whether to pay out the available cash at hand or to set aside some cash and hoard more.
The advantage of paying out the available cash is that it can be invested more pro…tably outside the …rm (r > ). However, setting aside cash and hoarding increases the value of the investment opportunity upon its arrival, and every additional dollar saved is more valuable than the previous one. 17 Thus, if the probability of arrival is su¢ ciently large, 17 Not only does it allow to make the investment earlier, but it also reduces the time the already hoarded the manager sets aside all cash and continues hoarding until the investment opportunity arrives or until she has the necessary capital to invest immediately upon arrival without external …nancing. Since …rms with better investment opportunities hoard less cash after arrival (Proposition 1), our overall result is again that in total-considering pre-arrival and post-arrival hoarding-…rms with better prospects hoard less.
Proposition 6 (i) The manager hoards cash if the probability of arrival is su¢ ciently high. Otherwise, she pays out all initially available cash and does not hoard neither prenor post-arrival.
(ii) If the manager chooses to hoard cash, then, prior to the arrival of the investment opportunity, she sets aside all her initial cash and continues to hoard until the investment opportunity arrives (or until she becomes independent of external …nancing). Upon arrival of the investment opportunity, the manager follows Propositions 1-5.
We can contrast this insight to that from a setting based on information asymmetry. Just as there is no separation with hoarding after the arrival of the investment opportunity (Proposition 3), there can be no separation when cash hoarding also takes place prior to arrival. First, consider the case in which the type of investment opportunity is unknown to the manager prior to arrival. In this case, the …nancing terms will be fair in expectation, so that the manager will not hoard.
Second, suppose that the manager knows the type of the project already prior to arrival. We have shown that the owner-manager invests immediately after arrival even if there is information asymmetry at this stage or she does not invest at all (Proposition 3). Hence, the bene…t and the cost of hoarding an additional unit of cash before arrival are independent of the previously hoarded amount. Thus, the manager either prefers to hoard until arrival or not to hoard at all and pay out the available cash at hand. Hoarding to be able to make an investment, thus, occurs if the probability of arrival is su¢ ciently high. Taking the pre-and post-arrival results together, information asymmetry alone cannot predict why …rms that hoard cash to …nance an investment opportunity hoard di¤erent amounts depending on the pro…tability of this opportunity.
Cash Hoarding and Type of Financing
In the preceding analysis, we have assumed that the manager issues equity to …nance the investment. This assumption is harmless in that it does not qualitatively change any of the preceding results, but-as we show-di¤erent types of securities may a¤ect the level of cash will remain locked-up in the …rm prior to undertaking the investment-an e¤ect which increases in that amount. cash hoarding. The optimal …nancing contract would minimize the friction coming from disagreement.
The underlying driver for the optimal …nancial contract in a setting with disagreement is to o¤er a contract whose value is least dependent on disagreement. From the manager's perspective, the …nancier should be least sensitive to whether the project turns out to be good (as the manager believes) or bad (as the …nancier suspects could be the case). This is reminiscent of the intuition in the earlier asymmetric information literature (e.g., Nachman and Noe, 1994), in which the manager prefers to issue debt since, as a less informationsensitive security, it minimizes underpricing. While this analogy is interesting, recall that the setting with asymmetric information does not produce insights on hoarding. This is di¤erent in our vision setting, as now the type of …nancing does a¤ect hoarding.
Proposition 7
The manager optimally hoards less cash to co-…nance an investment if she has access to more debt …nancing.
Being able to issue a security that makes the …nancier's payo¤ less sensitive to disagreement is intuitively similar to having less disagreement in the …rst place. Hence, all else equal, switching to such a security induces the manager to hoard less cash and raise more external …nancing for the investment. This is precisely the e¤ect of having access to debt …nancing.
Share Repurchases and Dividend Policy
Our analysis so far has concentrated on cash hoarding. A related question is whether our model has something to say about payout decisions in the form of dividends and share repurchases, which both are elements of cash policy. The answer is straightforward: When outside …nancing is needed, payouts (which increase the funding need) should be minimized in both the vision-based and asymmetric information setups. That is, spending the available cash on share repurchases or dividend payments increases the …rm's dependence on outside …nancing and is just costly. Thus, returning a dollar to shareholders in the form of repurchases or dividends is worth less to the manager than spending it on reducing this dependence. 18 Observe also that with asymmetric information repurchases or dividends cannot help the …rm signal its investment opportunities. Intuitively, for such a signaling mechanism to be credible, the manager must spend more on share repurchases (or dividends) than she receives from issuing new securities. 19 Proposition 8 If the manager needs external …nancing for new investments, and there are di¤erences in vision or information asymmetry about the pro…tability of the new investment, the …rm should optimally not pay out cash.
Private Bene…ts
The assumption that the manager and …nanciers have di¤erent visions should also be distinguished from a setting in which the di¤erence in valuations is due to private bene…ts. Speci…cally, suppose that the manager and the …nancier agree that the expected cash ‡ows are W M , but the manager additionally gains a private bene…t B from investing that cannot be shared with outsiders. In such a setting, the net expected payo¤ of the manager at the moment of investment equals (cf. (4)):
Observe that (13) does not depend on the amount of co-investment w. What this means is that hoarding cash to reduce the dependence on external …nancing is useless for the manager. Intuitively, both parties value the expected cash ‡ows W M in the same way, and a larger co-investment w does not change the fact that the private bene…t B accrues only to the manager. This is the crucial di¤erence to the case with disagreement. There, the manager's motive for co-investing w (and, hence, hoarding) is that she has a higher valuation of the cash ‡ows than the …nancier ( W F < W M ). 20 The insight that private bene…ts do not lead to hoarding has actually been recognized in the recent empirical literature analyzing Jensen's (1986) free cash ‡ow hypothesis. This literature claims that …rms, su¤ering from the private bene…ts problem, have less cash as they spend their free cash ‡ow more quickly on new investments (e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford et al., 2008). 19 Signaling may be possible if the information asymmetry is not about the …rm's investment opportunities, but about its assets in place (Bhattacharya, 1979) . 20 There could be a motive for cash hoarding only if the manager cannot raise …nancing even if she pledges all expected cash ‡ows to the …nancier-i.e., if W M < K w 0 . In such a case, the manager will either not invest at all or will hoard cash until she can raise su¢ cient …nancing by pledging all cash ‡ows to the …nancier; that is, essentially selling the …rm.
Cash Hoarding and Incentives
An important issue for entrepreneurial …rms is that external …nancing, which lowers the owner-manager's stake in the …rm, could reduce her incentives to exert e¤ort, increasing further the cost of external …nancing (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). We, thus, compare the model structure based on di¤erences in vision to one based on incentives problems. Our results are robust also in this context. 21 Speci…cally, suppose that conditional on being undertaken, the investment succeeds with probability e, in which case it yields W , and fails with probability 1 e, in which case it yields zero. The success probability re ‡ects the e¤ort exerted by the manager at cost
(assumed is that e¤ort is undertaken after the investment). It is straightforward to show that there will be cash hoarding also in such a setting, and managers with better projects (high ) have incentives to hoard less cash. Indeed, assuming again equity …nancing, the manager's problem is to choose co-investment w and the optimal level of e¤ort b e that maximize her expected payo¤
where e is the equilibrium level of e¤ort anticipated by the …nancier. The conceptual di¤erence to our baseline setting is that increasing the level of coinvestment (and, thus, cash hoarding) not only increases the manager's stake in the …rm, but also increases the equilibrium level of e¤ort, and so the expected size of the …rm. We verify in the Appendix that this additional complexity does not alter our qualitative results. Thus, our predictions also extend to a setting in which the main problem is not one of di¤erences in vision-arguably more pertinent to young and growth …rms-but where the main friction is that outsiders fear that insiders have insu¢ cient incentives to exert e¤ort. This is an interesting complementary explanation for cash hoarding.
Time-Varying Disagreement and Pro…tability
Our baseline speci…cation assumes that di¤erences in vision between the manager and …nanciers remain constant over time. However, one could argue that disagreement could vary and that the manager could try to time the market and raise …nancing when it is most bene…cial to do so. Incorporating these features does not change our qualitative predictions.
One straightforward way to model change in disagreement is to assume that disagreement could fully disappear at any given instant with some positive probability, and remains otherwise unchanged. Speci…cally, suppose that the time until such an event follows an exponential distribution with parameter . If disagreement disappears, the manager invests immediately as external …nancing seizes to be costly, and her expected payo¤ is W M K. While such feature could create another motive for delaying investment, our qualitative results remain unchanged: Firms with better investment opportunities …nd it more costly to delay and, hence, hoard less cash.
The other issue is that the expected value of the investment opportunity could vary over time. Delay in investment could, then, occur for two reasons: delaying not only to hoard cash, but also to wait for the value of the investment opportunity to increase. Indeed, assuming that the NPV of the investment opportunity increases on average over time is a standard assumption in the related real options literature (e.g., Bolton et al., 2013). Our results remain robust also in such a setting. In particular, let the increase in NPV come from a lower investment outlay K. We now have that at any level of accumulated cash, a lower K implies a lower need for external …nancing. This reduction in the need for external funding implies that the …rm is willing to invest at a lower level of accumulated cash. 22 However this doesn't change our previous insight that …rms with better investment opportunities (high ) delay and hoard less. We make all claims from this section more formal in the Appendix.
Empirical Implications
In what follows, we discuss several empirical implications of our model. We discuss in turn predictions related to the links between cash hoarding, the …rm's investment opportunities and performance, the role played by the degree of disagreement , the di¤erences in terms of hoarding we expect between public and private …rms, and the impact of the type of …nancing instruments on hoarding.
Cash Hoarding, Growth Options, and Performance The free cash ‡ow theory of Jensen (1986) predicts that managers may invest in negative NPV projects rather than distributing cash to shareholders. Yet the empirical evidence on the relation between cash holdings and agency problems is rather mixed. Harford's (1999) …nding that cash-rich …rms perform worse in takeovers, but is still consistent with the overall result that growth opportunities (and hence q) go hand in hand with cash. Hence, our model complements existing explanations by establishing a relation between cash hoarding policy, growth options, and performance. Our …rst main prediction is: Implication 1: (i) Growth …rms hoard more cash than …rms without growth prospects.
(ii) From the subset of …rms with growth prospects, …rms with lower cash-to-assets ratios are more pro…table than …rms with higher ratios (i.e., more pro…table opportunities go hand in hand with less hoarding).
23 (iii) Firms with more pro…table investment opportunities co-…nance new investments with a higher proportion of external funds. Our results complement precautionary based explanations (e.g., Bolton et al., 2011) by establishing a relation between the pro…tability of a …rm's investment and its choice between internal and external …nancing (Proposition 6). An interesting insight from these results is that there is a self-reinforcing mechanism in which …rms with more pro…table opportunities also invest and grow more quickly. Furthermore, we can expect that as these …rms mature and start generating cash ‡ows at a higher rate than they need for new investments, they could end up with large cash holdings despite pursuing a low-cash strategy in their growth phase.
Implication 2:
Maturing growth …rms with strong cash ‡ows and, thus, potentially high cash holdings, previously hoard little cash while still in their active growth phase.
Several recent empirical studies propose that …rms with weak corporate governance will hoard less cash, because they spend their free cash ‡ow on new investments more quickly (Harford et al., 2008; Gao et al., 2013) . Indeed, these papers …nd that weak corporate governance is correlated with weak performance. However, there is no clear relation between performance, governance, and excess cash holdings, though …rms with better performance hoard less cash (Harford et al., 2008) . Our preceding implication may explain why. Growth …rms with better investment opportunities hoard less cash, delaying investment less and, thus, spending their free cash more quickly. This counteracts the e¤ect that …rms with agency problems spend their cash (more quickly) on bad projects. We can summarize this as follows.
Implication 3: Firms with better investment opportunities hoard less cash and, thus, spend their free cash more quickly. This can help explain the negative relation between cash hoarding and performance and the lack of evidence relating performance, governance, and hoarding in the empirical literature focusing on agency problems.
Another implication of our basic insight that …rms hoard less cash and use less internal …nancing if their investment opportunities are better is that the stock price reaction to new investments …nanced with a higher proportion of external …nancing should be more positive. The following implications have not been tested to our knowledge.
Implication 4:
The stock price reaction to major investments by growth …rms should be more positive if a higher fraction of these investments is …nanced from external sources.
Our model could also be interpreted in the context of a …rm expanding through acquisitions. Based on Implications 1 and 4, we expect: Implication 5: (i) Early acquirers in merger waves should have better long-run performance. (ii) The stock price reaction of acquirers …nancing a higher proportion of their cash payments in takeovers from external sources should be higher.
Observe that the second part of the preceding implication is not related to the method of payment in takeovers, but to how the cash payment is …nanced. 24 Indeed, in the majority of takeovers paid in cash, the cash payment is externally …nanced (e.g., Martynova and Renneboog, 2009 ). For these cases, we predict that high-growth acquirers operating in more disagreement-prone industries (e.g., R&D intensive) that …nance their cash payments in takeovers with a higher proportion of outside …nancing will do better.
Cash Hoarding and Degree of Disagreement
The main focus of our implications above was that …rms will hoard cash if disagreement plays a role and alignment is di¢ cult.
However, the degree of disagreement is a separate factor a¤ecting cash hoarding (Proposition 1). Controlling for it is imperative, as a …rm with better investment opportunities, but facing very high disagreement, could end up hoarding more cash than a …rm with poorer investment opportunities, but for which disagreement is less of an issue. We expect this to be re ‡ected in the data in the following way.
Implication 6: Growth …rms facing more proxy …ghts, …rms for which there is a higher dispersion of analyst forecasts, or whose non-voting shares trade at a larger discount relative to the voting shares, hoard more cash for new investments. This is also true for growth …rms investing into unfamiliar businesses, more R&D intensive …rms, or …rms that may be reluctant to disclose sensitive information. 25 Bates et al. (2009) hypothesize that R&D intensive …rms hoard more cash, since adverse shocks and …nancial distress are more costly in the presence of growth opportunities (see also Opler et al., 1999) . They …nd this relationship despite controlling for other measures of growth opportunities, such as Tobin's q. Our analysis can help explain this: For the same growth opportunities (e.g., controlled for by Tobin's q), R&D intensive …rms hoard more cash, because in such …rms di¤erences in vision-and, hence, disagreement-between entrepreneurs and their …nanciers will be more pronounced.
As the nature of growth …rms changes across the board, we also predict that:
As the composition of growth …rms in the economy changes towards …rms for which di¤erences in vision and disagreement between entrepreneurs and …nanciers are more likely, the aggregate cash holdings in the economy will increase.
Indeed, Bates et al. (2009) argue that the reason for more cash holdings in the economy is that the nature of …rms has changed. In particular, they …nd that newly listed …rms are more R&D intensive. Furthermore, Falato et al. (2013) …nd that …rms have shifted towards holding more intangible assets. They argue that …rms hoard more cash, because intangibles cannot be o¤ered as collateral when raising debt. 26 Our model complements this argument. Since there is arguably more disagreement about the value of intangibles, our theory helps explain why growth …rms choose to depend less on outside …nancing in general, potentially delaying investment, as opposed to shifting towards more equity issuance.
Cash Hoarding in Public vs. Private Firms, Type of Financing, and Payouts Our theory also makes novel predictions regarding the cash holdings in public and private …rms. In contrast to precautionary-based theories, which would predict that private …rms should hoard more cash as they are more …nancially constrained, we show that private …rms actually hoard less cash (cf. Proposition 2). Importantly, our theory takes into account that growth …rms self-select whether they want to remain private or public. The following implication focuses on …rms that have the necessary scale to operate both as a public and a private …rm.
Implication 8: A growth …rm operating as a publicly held …rm hoards more cash than when it chooses to be private.
This surprising prediction …nds strong support in a recent empirical study by Gao et al. (2013) . They show that public …rms hoard up to twice as much cash as comparable private …rms. Furthermore, Asker et al. (2013) …nd that private …rms not only have more cash, but they also invest more, have higher investment sensitivity, and have a higher return on assets. These …ndings are supportive of our prediction that entrepreneurial …rms with better investment opportunities remain private and invest more quickly as they hoard less cash to co-…nance their investments.
Our model also predicts that the type of …nancing that …rms have access to will a¤ect how much cash they need to hoard for new investments.
Implication 9: Growth …rms with higher debt capacity hoard less cash. It is interesting to discuss the implications of our analysis for …rms that have all the cash they need to undertake new investments. For such …rms we predict that the best use of cash would be to use it for new investment opportunities. Returning cash to shareholders in the form of dividends or share repurchases is justi…able only if it is not needed for new investments (cf. Proposition 8). It is strictly suboptimal in the case of di¤erences in vision (disagreement), and also has little e¤ect in the presence of information asymmetry. Indeed, a number of empirical studies have shown that the market reaction to dividend announcements is mixed (DeAngelo et al., 1996 (DeAngelo et al., , 2000 , implying that they are only a weak instrument for signaling quality. Similarly, the market does not react strongly to share repurchases announcements by …rms even if they subsequently outperform (Ikenberry et al., 1995), which is also in line with our results that repurchases are not an e¤ective instrument to signal growth opportunities (Proposition 8).
Implication 10: Returning cash to shareholder is not e¢ cient if it is needed for new investments regardless of whether the management and …nanciers have di¤erent visions or whether they have asymmetric information.
Managing Cash Reserves A speci…c feature of our model is that the cash level changes stochastically over time. One implication of this assumption is that if the manager could a¤ect the volatility of this accumulation, she would choose higher volatility ( 2 ) even if the expected growth rate ( ) remains the same. Intuitively, the higher volatility increases the real option value of waiting to invest. This is especially relevant for …rms investing their cash reserves in the capital market (before they need them for an in-house investment), which is common in practice. 27 Interestingly, this prediction …nds support in a recent paper by Duchin et al. (2014) who …nd that high growth (high q) …rms are more likely to invest their cash reserves in riskier assets.
Implication 11. Growth …rms hoarding cash to reduce their dependence on outside …nancing are more likely to park the existing cash in riskier assets.
Conclusion
In a simple dynamic theory of optimal cash hoarding, we analyze whether a growth …rm will choose to delay investments in order to hoard cash and depend less on outside …nance. In our setting, …rms hoard cash because they may view outside …nancing as prohibitively expensive due to disagreement with outside …nanciers about the …rm's prospects. We …nd, …rst, that …rms with better investment opportunities hoard less cash and …nance a higher fraction of new investments with outside …nancing. The key reason is that they …nd it more costly to delay a more pro…table opportunity. This is true despite the fact that their relative bene…t of retaining a higher stake in the …rm is also higher.
Other insights follow as well. We show that …rms that choose to operate as private …rms hoard less cash than they would if they operated as public …rms. This is because …rms choose to be private when they value the bene…t from a higher alignment with …nanciers-the bene…t of being private-more than the costs associated with o¤ering less liquid securities. That is, …rms choose to be private when they prefer …nancing a new investment with more external …nancing and less internally generated cash. This surprising prediction …nds support in recent empirical work.
The second contribution of our paper is to provide for a better understanding of the e¤ect of di¤erent …nancing frictions on cash hoarding. Our intuition and result translate also to a setting in which …nancing is costly due to incentive problems ala Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) . However, an important insight is that restating the model in terms of information asymmetry or private bene…ts (instead of disagreement) yields only pooling outcomes in which investments are not delayed, and no cross-sectional predictions on cash hoarding ensue. The disagreement-based analysis, thus, helps enrich our understanding of cash policy. This is particularly interesting, because the relevance of di¤erences in vision and disagreement has mushroomed in the modern era in which structural shifts-e.g. developments in information technology-impact …rms and industries, yet for now leave substantial uncertainty about viable future business models. In this environment, choices have to be made that are far from routine, more visionary, trial-and-error based, and hence prone to disagreement.
Our results also provide new insights on the dynamics of …rm development and cash holdings (as opposed to hoarding). Our analysis focuses on growth …rms that are short on cash and operate in an uncertain environment. The ones with the best investment opportunities will choose to grow rapidly using outside funding, and relative to their lesser peers will be cash-poor. However, on average, they will be more pro…table and successful. This implies that in the follow-up stage after they have established themselvesand possibly some uncertainty has been resolved-they may start earning cash at a higher rate than needed for investment and growth. High cash holdings are then a sign of past success. One could argue that the massive cash holdings of …rms like Google, Microsoft, and Apple are a re ‡ection of this. Our theory primarily focuses on the 'pre-abundance of cash'stages. 28 The analysis in this paper could also help understand and explain broader issues. Our theory has some interesting implications for the industrial development in the uncertain disagreement-prone, visionary environment. An important implication of our analysis is that …rms with better opportunities are not just better but also invest sooner (no delays in investment). This creates reinforcing e¤ects allowing successful …rms to di¤erentiate themselves even faster. The result resembles an accelerated Darwinian survival process with 'winners taking it all'. This is in sharp contrast to the pooling outcome in an asymmetric information setting, in which the implied cross-subsidization slows down the Darwinian process.
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Appendix A: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Di¤erentiating (6) with respect to w we obtain
The …rst term shows the time-value-loss of waiting for w to increase, while the second term shows the bene…t from obtaining cheaper …nancing when increasing the co-investment. Note that if W F > K, the right-hand-side (RHS) is negative and hoarding cash is never optimal. Hence, the manager only hoards cash if the disagreement with the …nancier is su¢ ciently strong and W F < K. Then, the …rst order condition (FOC) yields:
The second order condition is
At the internal optimum (when the FOC holds), which is the case when W F < K, the second line on the RHS is zero, and the expression is negative. Clearly, if the initial cash at hand is w 0 > w , the manager invests immediately. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) If a …rm chooses to remain private, then a necessary condition for this to be more bene…cial is that
where for the second equality (16) we plug in for w priv and w priv from (9) and (10).
The inequality in the last line (17) follows from the fact that W
implying that also the term
in (16) is less than one. Thus, a necessary condition is that the last line (17) is positive, which is true only if the last term
is positive, implying that w priv < w pub .
(ii) From (16), the manager is just indi¤erent between private and public ownership if
where we have pugged in for w priv and w pub from (9) and (10) . Observe now that the manager strictly prefers staying private as
the LHS of (18) is a constant, while the RHS increases in L. Thus, there is a unique threshold L , above which the manager prefers going public. We show next that the indi¤erence threshold L must be increasing in . Observe that the LHS of (18) is bounded between zero and one, while the second term on the RHS is greater than one. Hence, the …rst term on the RHS must be less than one, implying that
, while the RHS increases in L and decreases in as:
where we have used that L < W F ( priv ) W 
Thus, as claimed in footnote 13, for single crossing it is su¢ cient that the manager's and the …nanciers'assessments of …rm value are increasing in (and not necessarily linear in ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Take any two types H > L , which hoard cash w H and w L to signal their types, respectively. Absent disagreement, we have W F = W M , and the incentive constraint of types L and H not to mimic each other's strategies are
In what follows, we show that there can be no separating equilibrium in which high types hoard less (Claim 1) or more (Claim 2) cash than low types. Subsequently, we show that in the only pooling equilibrium that survives D1, the manager does not hoard cash (Claim 3).
Claim 1.
There is no separating equilibrium in which a high type hoards less cash than lower types who also receive …nancing (i.e., w L w H cannot hold) Observe that (20) can be rewritten as
Note that the RHS decreases in 
Claim 2. There is no separating equilibrium in which a high type hoards more cash than lower types (i.e., w L < w H cannot hold).
Observe that (20) and (21) can be rewritten as
Claim 3. In the only pooling equilibrium that survives D1, the manager does not hoard cash.
Suppose that there is a pooling equilibrium in which all types pool at a cash level
We start by de…ning D1 in the context of this game. For use below, note that …nding the most expensive …nancing contract (i.e., …nancier's response) e ( ) for which type is willing to deviate is equivalent to …nding the worst out-of-equilibrium beliefs e ( ) for which the investor still breaks even (i.e., e = K w e W ) and for which the manager is willing to deviate.
De…nition 1 For every deviation e
w, determine for every type the most "expensive" …-nancing contract e ( ), respectively the worst out-of-equilibrium beliefs e ( ), for which the deviation payo¤ e U w t ; e w; e ; is higher than the equilibrium expected payo¤ U w t ; w P ; b ;
e ( ) = arg min e e e U w t ; e w; e e ; j e U w t ; e w; e e ; U w t ; w P ; b ;
Then, D1 requires that the …nancier believe that the deviation comes from the types who …nd e w attractive for the most expensive contract, respectively for the worst out-of-equilibrium beliefs 2 arg min e ( ).
Suppose that we observe a downward deviation from w P . In what follows we show that the type most likely to have deviated is the highest type. Observe, …rst, that when the investor breaks even, there is a type 0 2 ; for whom w P coincides with w V M , implying that @ @w P e U w t ; w P ; e ; 8 > < > :
@ @ e e U w t ; w P ; e ; 8 > < > :
Hence, to keep the same utility as on the equilibrium path following a decrease from w P , we have to decrease e for > 0 . Moreover, since the marginal rate of substitution d e dw P increases in (analogously to Lemma 2), the change in e must be highest for the highest type. Hence, the higher the type, the higher the decrease in e (and so the higher e ( )) that the manager is prepared to tolerate following a deviation to e w < w P .
We can, thus, construct a deviation contract (e ; e w) with e w < w P , such that only types ( 00 ; ] (where 00 ! ) …nd it pro…table to deviate relative to their expected payo¤ on the equilibrium path, and such that the …nancier makes a strictly positive expected pro…t when accepting for any out-of-equilibrium beliefs that place probability one on the deviation coming from this set of types. 29 By the de…nition above of D1 above, the deviation is successful for any re…ned out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Finally, we show that we can support a pooling equilibrium with w P = w 0 provided that
, where b is the expectation over the set of types for which …nancing and investment yields more than w 0 . Suppose that this set of types is just ; (the argument for other sets is analogous). Suppose that the …nancier observes a deviation to e w > w 0 . By analogous arguments to above, lower types have a higher incentive for such a deviation relative to higher types. Suppose that there is an equity share for which the deviation is pro…table for types [ ; 000 ). By D1 the …nancier should restrict his out-of-equilibrium beliefs to this set of types. In particular, he can believe that the deviation comes from type with probability one. However, it is straightforward to show that for such beliefs the …nancier does not break even for a deviation that makes type (the type most likely to have deviated) better o¤, implying that the …nancier would not accept the deviation.
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the following candidate for an equilibrium. All types 0 raise all …nancing (K w 0 ) as private …rms, while types < 0 pool and raise all …nancing as public …rms, where
Intuitively, the managers with the best investment opportunities remain private as the bene…t of avoiding underpricing outweighs the illiquidity cost L. Instead, managers for which avoiding the illiquidity costs L outweighs the potential cost of underpricing pool and go public. Clearly, if L is very high, all …rms would go public. In what follows we verify that this is an equilibrium.
Consider …rst the incentive constraint that private …rms (types 0 ) do not prefer deviating to going public and being treated as type pub :
This constraint boils down to
Consider next the incentive constraint that public …rms (types < 0 ) do not deviate 29 The latter is feasible, as in a pooling equilibrium types ( 00 ; ] cross subsidize lower types, implying that the …nancier (who breaks even in expectation) actually makes a pro…t on these types. 30 Recall that in a pooling equilibrium, type is cross subsidized from higher types. Thus, the …nancier actually makes a loss on this type. to going private, in which case their type is revealed and they incur L
which is satis…ed if
Furthermore, note that private …rms never choose to delay investment and hoard cash, since this does not reduce L, but (absent disagreement) it only delays the positive NPV investment. Similarly, public …rms also do not hoard following the same reasoning as in Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. We show …rst the existence of a separating equilibrium. Then we show that there is no pooling equilibrium that survives D1.
Claim 1. There is a unique separating equilibrium
To show existence of a separating equilibrium, we follow standard arguments. 31 Rewrit-
ing (11), we obtain
Taking the FOC and assuming that a separating equilibrium exists-i.e., w
To solve this equation we need the appropriate boundary condition. Since a high type has no incentive to mimic low types, we can set: w = w V M , where w V M is given by expression (7). We can now apply Theorems 1-3 from Mailath (1987) to prove the proposition (in Appendix B we verify that the conditions for these theorems are satis…ed). From these theorems it follows that there is a unique separating equilibrium in which w is continuous and di¤erentiable, satis…es (22) , and
has the same sign as
We now show that w < w V M . To see this, rewrite (22) as
Compare (23) to the optimality condition (15) in Proposition 1. The RHS of (23) is positive, while it is zero absent information asymmetry. Thus, taking into account that the LHS decreases in w , we must have w < w V M .
Claim 2. There is no pooling equilibrium that survives D1 The di¤erence to Proposition 3 is that the level of cash at which the manager is just indi¤erent between investing and not investing is decreasing in her type . Hence, the only pooling equilibrium with w > w 0 , for which we cannot construct a successful deviation for the highest type (in a pool) for any out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfying D1 (which are trivial and place probability one on a downward deviation coming from this type) is at her indi¤erence point. This contradicts the existence of a pooling equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Observe …rst that the expected value of the investment opportunity upon its arrival is U (w 0; ; w ), where U is given by (6) from Section 2 and w 0; is the cash level that the manager has hoarded before arrival. It is straightforward to verify that U (w 0; ; w ) is strictly increasing and convex in w 0; (cf. footnote 17). Suppose now that it is optimal to stop hoarding before arrival and before the manager has hoarded K -i.e., w 0; < K. We argue to a contradiction that this cannot be the case.
Suppose that before arrival, having reached w 0; , the hoarded amount w t increases above w 0; . Paying out w t w 0; cannot be optimal if hoarding until w 0; is optimal. First, the probability of arrival is the same at every instant. Second (given the convexity of U ), the marginal increase in the option value U that the manager would have after arrival is increasing in the hoarded amount before arrival. In contrast, paying out a unit of cash has the same value to the manager regardless of the previously hoarded amount. Hence, if hoarding dominates paying out for w t < w 0; , it is more bene…cial also for w t > w 0; .
To determine whether the manager should start hoarding, we have to compare the expected payo¤ from hoarding as prescribed above with paying out w 0 . Clearly, this expected payo¤ must be increasing in the probability of arrival . Hence, there is a threshold , above which setting aside w 0 and hoarding is optimal. In this case, the manager hoards until the arrival of the investment opportunity and, upon arrival, follows Propositions 1. Note that the manager will stop hoarding cash once she becomes independent of external …nancing. 32 Next, we discuss the setting with information asymmetry. 33 Similarly to above, for any given beliefs of the …nancier, the optimal hoarding decision is not strictly quasiconcave (see also main text). It is either optimal to hoard cash until arrival (or becoming independent of external …nancing) or it is better to pay out all cash at hand w 0 . Hence, there is no separating equilibrium in which di¤erent types hoard di¤erent amounts of cash before arrival (Mailath's condition 4) fails). For each type there is again a threshold (increasing in ) so that the manager hoards cash if > . It is straightforward to show that in equilibrium, there is a cuto¤ type 0 determined by = 0 such that (for the corresponding …nancier's beliefs) all < 0 pay out w 0 and do not hoard cash neither prenor post-arrival, while all 0 hoard cash until arrival and then follow Proposition 3.
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Thus, information asymmetry alone cannot predict why …rms that hoard cash to …nance an investment opportunity hoard di¤erent amounts depending on the pro…tability of this opportunity. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. To be able to compare debt and equity …nancing, we have to specify the cash ‡ow generating process of the new project. Suppose that the good and the bad project are governed by a common cash ‡ows generating process: dx t = x x t dt + x x t dZ t with x ; x > 0 and with Z denoting a Brownian motion. Let the scrap value of the project be S. Ex ante, the initial value of this process x 0 is unknown, but the cumulative density function (cdf) over the possible realizations of x 0 for the good projects dominates that for the bad project in terms of FOSD. All of this is common knowledge. Observe that, after the investment is sunk and the initial value has been realized, the …nancier cannot infer whether the realization of x 0 is due to the project being good or bad.
Before investment, the manager's and the …nancier's assessments of the project's ex- 32 To avoid the risk that the cash at hand falls below K , she may hoard slightly more than K before starting to pay out. Furthermore, note that if the manager does not start hoarding, she pays out w 0 and then cannot invest upon arrival. 33 The case combining information asymmetry and disagreement is analogous. 34 It can also be shown that there is no separating equilibrium in which, before starting to hoard, di¤erent types separate by paying out di¤erent amounts of cash. Intuitively, such a signal is more expensive for higher types, as their investment opportunity is more valuable. pected payo¤ are
where E M is conditional on the project being good, and E F assumes that it is good only with probability . Furthermore, 2 is the negative root of Suppose now that the manager promises a small constant debt coupon payment " in addition to an equity share e . Furthermore, let the manager's share of the liquidation proceeds be (1 ) S " r " r , implying that the …nancier is guaranteed " r even in liquidation. Clearly, stipulating such a share is feasible for S > 0 and " su¢ ciently small. It is straightforward to check that it is optimal for the manager to liquidate the project at
x d for such a sharing rule in liquidation (as it is optimal for pure equity …nancing). The equity share e that satis…es the …nancier's participation constraint is e = . By similar arguments to Proposition 1, we obtain that before investing, the manager hoards:
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof focuses on the case with asymmetric information. Suppose that the manager owns only a fraction of the …rm, and the remaining is owned by external shareholders. Consider a candidate for a separating equilibrium in which the highest type repurchases a fraction 2 , so that after the repurchase she owns (1 2 ). Clearly, since delay is costly and it is not possible for high types to separate through cash hoarding, it is without loss of generality to focus on the "static" case in which the manager repurchases the shares and raises new …nancing in the same period. On a competitive market, the price p at which type repurchases a fraction 2 of the …rm must solve where we use that existing shareholders should be indi¤erent between selling and not selling their shares at the fair price. Hence, the incentive constraint of type not to mimic type is
which, after plugging for p, boils down to ( ) (K w) 0, contradicting that K > w.
Finally, note that if K w, underpricing is irrelevant for the manager, as she can …nance the project out of her own funds. Next, we show by contradiction that there cannot exist an equilibrium in which the …rm separates by paying out dividends. First, observe that if the manager does not separate with a dividend payment, she cannot do so through cash hoarding following such a payment (Proposition 3). Thus, the only candidate for a separating equilibrium is paying a dividend and then investing immediately. Then, the incentive constraint of any type L < H not to mimic type H is
where (w t w i ) is the dividend paid by type i . Using that without disagreement W M = W F , (25) can be rewritten as w H K, leading to the desired contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof: Cash Hoarding and Incentives (Section 5.6). We brie ‡y verify the claim that the incentives problem sketched in the main text leads to the same qualitative predictions as di¤erences in vision. Suppose that for some given level of co-investment w by the manager, the …nancier expects an equilibrium level of e¤ort e , prompting him to require a share of the …rm = K w e W
. In such a case, it is optimal for the manager to choose Proof: Time-varying disagreement and pro…tability (Section 5.7). We brie ‡y formalize our claims from Section 5.7.
(i) Time varying disagreement: Let f W F be the …nancier's valuation of the …rm given that he knows that, after investing, disagreement could disappear with probability at any given point in time. 36 Applying the modi…ed Ito's lemma for jump processes and following similar steps to Section 3, it is straightforward to show that the manager optimally hoards
where is the positive root to 1 2 2 y (y 1) + y r = 0. It is straightforward to verify that this leads to the same qualitative insights as in Section 3.
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(ii) Time-varying pro…tability: We illustrate the argument by making a simplifying assumption that allows us to solve the resulting problem analytically. Speci…cally, suppose that the NPV of the project from the …nanciers'point of view follows
where Z K is a standard Brownian motion and K > 0 with a correlation to Z. We assume that K < 0 implying that the NPV increases on average over time. To simplify the analysis, we further assume that the change in NPV is entirely due to a change in the investment cost K. Following similar steps to Proposition 1, the manager's expected payo¤ is the solution to the following partial di¤erential equation 36 If he disagreement is about the starting value of the ‡ow process in analogy to Proposition 7, then f W F = W F . 37 Furthermore, single crossing holds for su¢ ciently small, which helps to extend also the results from Section 4. 
Plugging into (26), we obtain the simple ordinary di¤erential equation
with a value matching condition U ( ) = 
We see, thus, that the optimal co-investment w and the NPV from the …nancier's point of view are in a constant proportion at the optimal investment barrier. Along this barrier, the optimal cash level w increases with the investment cost K , and this level is lower when the investment opportunities are better (high ). Q.E.D. U ( ) j b = < 0 for b w 2 (0; k) where k is bounded away from in…nity. w remains the unique equilibrium even if k ! 1. To see this, observe that the single crossing property holds for w 2 (0; 1). Hence, local incentive compatibility of w guarantees also global incentive compatibility and w is a separating equilibrium even if k ! 1. Moreover, it is the unique equilibrium. Otherwise, there must be an alternative equilibrium with a type for whom w ( ) ! 1. However, for such a trigger, the option value component of this type's expected payo¤ is zero, whereas it is strictly positive for a positive trigger bounded away from in…nity. This makes a deviation pro…table, contradicting the existence of a di¤erent separating equilibrium than w .
Finally, we check when @ 2 @w @ U ( ) < 0 holds-i.e., condition 3). U is submodular in w and if
and so it should hold
Comparing this condition to (7), we see that submodularity holds as long as signaling does not require a too large distortion away from …rst best. Clearly, condition (28) is satis…ed for all types close enough to the lowest type, since w = w V M > w . A su¢ cient condition that it is satis…ed for all types is that W F > W M 1 K-i.e., that disagreement is not excessive. 38 Intuitively, if disagreement is excessively large, absent information asymmetry, all types …nd it optimal to accumulate large cash reserves and raise only little …nancing from outside …nanciers. Then, deviating too much from this strategy when there is information asymmetry, which may be needed for high types to separate from low types, could become too costly as the bene…t from overcoming information asymmetry does not compensate for the cost of increasing exposure to outside …nancing and, thus, disagreement. If condition (28) is violated, denote the lowest type for whom this is the case with 0 . Then, we can construct a separating equilibrium for types [ ; 0 ] characterized by (22) and w = w V M . The remaining types ( 0 ; ] then pool at the cash level w P < w 0 for which type 0 is indi¤erent between separating and pooling with the higher types. It is straightforward to …nd beliefs that support such an equilibrium. 38 This condition can be derived from requiring that for w = w -i.e., that w and w do not cross.
